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CASENOTE
MISSOURI'S 303(d) LIST NOW A "RULE": IS THIS GOOD FOR MISSOURI'S WATERS,
GOOD FOR AGRICULTURE, OR NO GOOD AT ALL?
MissouriSoybean Association v. The Missouri Clean Water Commission'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Missouri Clean Water Commission ("the Commission") included the Missouri and
Mississippi Rivers ("the rivers") on Missouri's 303(d) list ("the list") of waters that do not meet the state's
water quality standard. 2 Listing the rivers was the first step in a long, state-federal collaborative process
required by the Clean Water Act, which aims at controlling water pollution from all its sources. The Missouri
Soybean Association, along with other large agricultural interests, attacked the listing of the rivers in both
federal and state court. These groups sought a judicial declaration that the creation of the state's 303(d)
constitutes rulemaking, because as such, the 1998 list would be considered void for failure to abide by the
rulemaking procedures required by the Missouri Administrative Procedural Act. Although the Association lost
in both federal and state court, the Missouri Legislature enacted an amendment mandating that all future 303(d)
lists are rules. This note will discuss the motivations driving the Association and other agricultural groups to
seek mandates that agencies must follow rulemaking procedures when creating the 303(d) list. This note will
also discuss whether ultimately attaining that ruling, albeit legislatively, is really to their advantage, as well as
the potential effects the required administrative procedures could have on water pollution abatement.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 3 states are required to identify and list those waters within their
boundaries for which current pollution control measures are not strict enough, such that the waterbody meets
water quality standards set in accordance with the water's designated use.4 The 1998 list originated with
Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR"), who had developed a proposed list of impaired waters
for the 303(d) list, published that list for public comment, and revised the list. At a meeting in September of
1998, the Commission, the state entity with authority to approve the list for submission to the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), accepted the MDNR's proposed list and added three waters, including the Missouri
and Mississippi Rivers, in response to the input from the Sierra Club.
Identification of impaired waters and preparation of a 303(d) list is but the "starting point for the Clean
Water Act's pollution process."
The CWA next requires that the EPA approve each state's list.8 After
approval, the impaired waters undergo scientific study to establish the total maximum daily load ("TMDL") of
' 102 S.W.3d 10 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) [hereinafter Mo. Soybean Assn.].
2 Id. at 20; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313
(d)(1)(A) (2000).
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376.
4 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d)(1)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(1) (2002).

Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 20; see also Mo. Soybean Assn. v. Mo. Clean Water Connn., 2002 WL 45891 at *4

(Mo. App. W.D. 2002) [hereinafter Mo. Soybeanl.
6 Id.

American CanoeAssn., Inc. v. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d)(I)(A)).
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
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specifically identified pollutants that a body of water can absorb before its quality is affected.9 Before
submission to the EPA, the Commission had organized the 1998 list into three categories of TMDL
management for impaired waters: (1) those waters proposed for full TMDL development; (2) those waters
reported as impaired, but which required further environmental monitoring to confirm the waters as impaired
before prior to TMDL development; -and (3) those recognized as impaired but for which there was no practical
remedy.' The Commission listed theMissouri and Mississippi Rivers as impaired due to "habitat loss" due to
"channelization" and added them to the second category of listed waters.11 The .EPA granted approval of the
Commission's list after adding six more waters.' 2 Despite Missouri's categorization of the list, the EPA
required TMDL development for all waterbodies on the 1998-303(d) list.13
In anticipation of TMDL development, the Missouri Soybean Association ("MSA") brought an action
in federal court challenging the EPA's approval of the list.14 Judge Scott Wright of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the case with prejudice, on ripeness grounds.'* The court
found that the controversy was not ready for review because the complaint alleges harms that may occur only
after implementation of the presumably more stringent regulations mandated by the TMDLs.' 6 The court ruled
that such harms were too remote and speculative to adjudicate.' 7 The MSA appealed.' 8 The Federal Court of
Appeals also found that the action was not ripe, stating that "[m]ore stringent controls on water use . . . will not

occur until after TMDLs are developed and implemented. Even then it remains uncertain whether TMDL
development or regulatory implementation will adversely impact MSA's members." 9 Because the court did
not have jurisdiction over the unripe case, there was no adjudication on the merits; thus, dismissal was without
prejudice.2 0 The court ordered the case vacated and remanded. 2'
The MSA, along with other trade and business associations, 22 also filed a petition for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief pursuant to the CWA and the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act ("MAPA")
in the Circuit Court of Cole County. 23 MSA challenged the Commission's decision to include the rivers on the
list submitted to EPA under MAPA, which gives courts the power to render declaratory judgments on
administrative actions constituting a rule. 24 The plaintiffs argued that the promulgation of the list meets the
guidelines of a "rule" as defined by MAPA, and that the Commission's inclusion of the rivers therefore

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(c)(1); see also Sierra Club, North Star Chapter v. Browner, 843 F. Supp.
1304, 1306-07 (D. Minn.1993) (describing TMDL process).
10

Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 20.

" Id.
12 Id.
14

The final list contained a total of 165 waters.

See Mo. Soybean Assn. v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002).

" See id.

Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 28.; Harms alleged included decreases in property values, required changes in land
management practices, limitations on crop growth and rotation, and limitations on use of fertilizers and pesticides. Mo.
Soybean Assoc. v. EPA ,289 F.3d at 511.
16

'8

Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 29.
See Mo. Soybean Assn. v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509.

19

Id. at 512.

20

See id. at 513.
id

'7

21

The other appellants in the case are the Missouri Ag. Industries Council, Inc., Associated Industries of Missouri, and
the Missouri Chamber of Commerce. Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 14, n. 1.
23 Mo. Soybean, 2002 WL 45891
at *6.
22

24

Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 21-22.
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constituted rulemaking. 25 The plaintiffs also argued that they would incur a variety of injuries due to the
inclusion and the resulting TMDL requirements, including:
changes in land-management practices, limits on the sales and use of fertilizers and pesticides,
limits on crop growth and rotation, decreased crop yields, increased farming cost, limitations on
production and/or manufacturing quality and quality, changes in NPDES point source effluent
limitations, increased cost of water treatment, restrictions on locations for production and
manufacturing, and limitations on raw materials that could be used in production or
manufacturing.2 6
The court found that in creating the 1998-303(d) list, neither the Commission nor the MDNR had rendered a
final decision subject to judicial review.27 Judge Thomas Brown dismissed the petition with prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 28
The MSA appealed the decision.29 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and
held that Missouri's 1998-303(d) list was not a rule, and the development of the list was not rulemaking due to
the exception in § 536.010.4(c) of MAPA, which excludes "[a]n intergovernmental, interagency, or intraagency
memorandum, directive, manual or other communication." 30 The appellate court reasoned that the creation of
the 303(d) list, like the creation of these other forms of governmental communication, also does not
"substantially" affect the public's legal rights or the procedures available to the public. 3 1
The appellate court granted transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court in April of 2002, resulting in the
instant case. 3 The Supreme Court did not base its ruling on the intergovernmental communications exception
to rulemaking, as the appellate court had. Special Judge Lawrence Mooney held that the 1998-303(d) list of
impaired waters did not constitute a "rule" under MAPA because its creation did not have a substantial effect on
appellants' legal rights, and that the circuit court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment action challenging the decision to add the rivers to that list. 33 Due to the hypothetical nature of the
appellants claims, the court found, as the federal court had, that the case was not rive for review so the court
could not reach the merits; the judgment was modified to dismissal without prejudice. 4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FederalLaw

Act.Y

Before 1972. Congress attempted to control water pollution through the Federal Water Pollution Control
The Act focused regulatory efforts on water quality standards, which were to serve both to guide

25

Id..

26

Id.at 21.

27

Id.

id
29 See Mo. SoYbean. 2002 WL 45891 at *7.
30 Id. at * ll (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.010(4)(c)
(2000)).
31 Mo. Soybean, 2002 WL 45891 at *14.
28

32

See Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 10.

1

Id. at 29.

SId.

See Ann K. Wooster, Actions Brought Under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments Of 1972 (Clean Water
Act) (33 US.C.A. §§ 1251 etseq.)-Supreme Court Cases, 163 A.L.R. Fed. 531 (2000).
3
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performance by polluters and to trigger legal action to abate pollution.36 But the Act proved ineffective, as
evidenced by the Senate Committee on Public Works' statement that "the Federal water pollution control
program ... has been inadequate in every vital aspect."37 The problems arose from the nature of the standards
themselves, which focused only on the "tolerable effects rather than the preventable causes of water pollution,
from the awkwardly shared federal and state responsibility for promulgating such standards, and from the
cumbrous enforcement procedures."38 These factors combined to make it very difficult to develop and enforce
standards to govern individual polluters' conduct. 39
In response to the shortcomings of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Congress made important
amendments to the laws in 1972, which became known as "the Clean Water Act" ("CWA").40 Congress
enacted the CWA in an effort to restore and maintain "the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."41 Congress designed the CWA as comprehensive protection of unpolluted waters and as a
means of repairing damaged waters; the Supreme Court has consistently referred to the 1972 Act as intending
"to establish an all- compassing program of water pollution regulation" and "to establish a comprehensive longrange policy for the elimination of water pollution." 42 In order to meet these goals, the CWA posited "a major
shift in enforcement policy-away from primary reliance on water-quality standardS[431 and toward primary
reliance on specific effluent limits144] on all point sources." 45 Thus the amendments restrict the discharge of
pollution, regardless of whether the stream into which the waste was dumped was over-polluted at the time. 6
This new CWA enforcement policy is based on a partnership between the States and the Federal
Government, animated by a shared objective: "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters.' 47 Effluent limitations are promulgated b the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and water quality standards are promulgated by the States. With this partnership in mind,
Congress devised two distinct regulatory schemes for enforcement of the CWA.49 One5Frogram specifically
targeted point source (pollutants discharged from a pipe, conduit, or channel) pollution.5 The CWA's other
3
31
3'
39

EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd. 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
Sen. Rpt. 92-414, at 5 (October 28, 1971).
EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200, 202-03 (1976).
Id.

See Natural Resources Defense Council v. US. E.P.A., 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
40

42

43

See e.g., Milwaukee v. II.& Mich., 451 U.S. 304,
318 (1981).

The term "water quality standards" is defined as "provisions of State or Federal Law which consist of
a designated use

or uses for the waters of the United States and water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses. Water quality
standards are designed to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of [the

CWA]." 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(i).

An "effluent limitation" in turn is "any restriction established by a State or
the Administrator on quantities, rates, and
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources ...
including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
45 Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). A "point source" is "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
46 See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 92 (1992).
47 Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
14

48

See id.

Steven J. Blair, Student Author, No Looking Back: The Western District Court of Appeals Declares
that Missouri's
Creationofa 303(d) list Does Not Qualify as Rulemaking, 9 Mo. Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 154, 159 (2002).

49

50 Id.
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regulatory mechanism amounted to a combination of programs designed to reduce non-point source pollution
(those discharging pollutants as a. result of surface water runoff from farming, ranching, or logging
operations).
In order to control the discharge of a pollutant from a point source into the waters of the United
States,
the CWA created the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. 52 Under this
program, anyone wishing to discharge pollutants must receive a permit in order to do so. 3 These permits
mandate compliance with technology-based effluent limitations and state water quality standards. 4 They also
impose conditions on data and information collection, reporting, and such other requirements the administrator
deems appropriate.5 5 The Administrator of the EPA has the authority to issue such permits.56 The NPDES is
national in scope, is premised on the incorporation of the best available technology for reducing effluent
discharges,5 7 and is the "basis of the [CWA's] success., 58
Although the technology-based strategy of effluent limitations on all point sources (the NPDES permit
program) was its capstone, the 1972 Act nonetheless carried forward the pre-existing regime of water-quality
standards. 9 To do so, Congress developed the comprehensive, standards-setting section 303 of the CWA,
entitled the "Water Quality Standards and Implementation Plans." 60 No rivers or waters are exempted and all
are covered to the full extent of federal authority over navigable waters. 61 No distinction is drawn between
point sources and non-point sources. 62 Section 303 of the CWA "establishes both the process by which states

adopt their [water quality standards], and the process followed by the states to implement those standards." 63
The section ultimately aims at utilizing cooperative efforts by both Federal and State governments to achieve
ambient water quality standards. 64 This section has proved controversial, as the instant case illustrates.
Section 303(d) mandates three means of state'action.
First, 303(d) provides that each state compile a
list identifying those waters within its boundaries which fall below water quality standards, despite the
imposition of enumerated controls and treatments. 66 This submission is known as a section 303(d) list. 67 It then
requires the State to establish a priority ranking for these waters, taking into account the severity of the
pollution and the water's general uses.68 Finally, 303(d) requires the State to establish "Total Maximum Daily

52

See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1311.

54

Id.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1342. Under the Clean Water Act, the primary permitting and enforcement responsibility shifts to
the state if the state establishes a permit and enforcement program compatible with the federal program. and the state
program is approved by the administrator. Id.
6 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
58 Sarah Birkeland, EPA's TMDL Program,
28 Ecology L. Q. 297. 302 (2001).
Pronsolino,91 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-42.
6o Id. at 1343.
5

61

Id.
Id.

Blair, supra n. 49, at 160; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
See id.
See Mary E. Christopher, Time To Bite The Bullet: A Look Al State Implementation of Total Marimn
(TMDLs) Under Section 303(D) of The Cleam Water Act, 40 Washburn L.J. 480, 505 (2001).
6

67

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).

Sierra Club v. US. E.P.A., 162 F. Supp. 2d
406, 411 (D. Md. 2001).

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).

175

Daily Loads

MELPR, Vol. 11, No. 2
Load", ("TMDL") in accordance with the priority ranking. 69 Essentially, the TMDL program requires that the
state establish the total maximum daily load of pollutant for that water such that standards are met and water
quality is restored.70 Section 303(d) thereby became an "intersection between the old and new strategies."n It
calls for an assessment of the expected beneficial impact of the Act's main innovation: imposition of the best
effluent reduction technology could supply. 72 If those reductions alone are enough to bring a waterway into
compliance with standards, then no further action is required. . But if the reductions are not enough, then
Section 303(d)(1) requires the waterway to join a list of "unfinished business." 74
The final step, under Section 303(d)(2), is for the State to submit the prioritized list and TMDLs to the
EPA for its approval or disapproval," which the EPA is statutorily required to provide. Every state is required
to comply with the duties listed under Section 303(d), but if a state fails to do so or if the EPA disapproves the
list, then the EPA must create the list and TMDL schedule for the state.77
Missouri's development of its 303(d) list of impaired waters for the year 1998 is the subject of the appeal
in the instant case.
B. Missouri Law

The legislature delineated the State's policies regarding the protection of Missouri's waters in the
Missouri Clean Water Law in Chapter 644. The State's responsibilities under the CWA are carried out by two
administrative agencies: the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") and the Missouri Clean
Water Commission ("the Commission").79 Missouri's Constitution vests the MDNR with the duty to
"administer the programs of the state as provided by law relating to environmental control and the conservation
and management of natural resources." 0 The power to carry out the Clean Water Law's goal of ensuring the
continued purity of Missouri's waters is vested in the Commission-the state's water contaminant control
agency.8 ' The Commission is responsible for submitting the state's 303(d) list to the EPA.82
Agencies like MDNR and the Commission must follow the administrative formalities set out in the
Missouri Administrative Procedural Act ("MAPA") when promulgating rules or regulations. 83 Section
536.010(4) of the Missouri Revised Statutes defines a "rule" as "each agency statement of general applicability

69

Id.

'o See Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 16; see also American Canoe, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 913. EPA's regulations break

the TMDL into a "wasteload allocation" for point sources and a "load allocation" for non-point sources. 40 C.F.R. §
130.2.

" Pronsolino,91 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
72

id.

74

id.

7s Under the CWA, the EPA has 30 days in which to approve or disapprove a state's list of impaired waters. 33 U.S.C.

1313(d)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 130.30(b)(1).

76

7
78

See 40 C.F.R. § 131.21.
33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d)(2).
See Mo. Rev. Stat. §644.011 (2000).
Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 19.

82
8

Mo. Const. art. IV, §47.
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 640.010(3) & 644.021(1).
Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 20.
Mo. Soybean, 2002 WL 45891 at *7.
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that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or that describes the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency [subject to certain exceptions]." 84
Although defined broadly, the scope of a "rule" is limited by thirteen exclusions."s One such exclusion
is that "[a]n intergovernmental, interagency, or intraagency memorandum, directive, manual, or other
communication which does not substantially affect the legal rights of, or procedures available to, the public or
any segment thereof' is not a rule. 86 As such, these memoranda need not meet the guidelines for rulemaking
established by MAPA. This statutory definition has also been clarified by case law in Baugus v. the Directorof
Revenue.
Baugus provides that apart from exclusions, "not every generally applicable statement or
'announcement' of intent by a state agency is a rule."
Implicit in the concept of a "rule" is that the agency
declaration may potentially impact, however slightly, the substantive or procedural rights of some member of
the public. 89 By its nature, rulemaking "involves an agency statement that affects the rights of individuals in
the
abstract." 90
Rules promulgated by administrative agencies are valid only if the agency abides by MAPA's detailed
procedural mandates for rulemaking. No department, agency, commission or board rule is valid if: "(1)
[t]here
is an absence of statutory authority for the rule or any portion thereof; or (2) [t]he rule is in conflict with
state
law; or (3) [t]he rule is so arbitrary and capricious as to create such substantial inequity as to be unreasonably
burdensome on persons affected." 9 1 An agency cannot propose a rule unless, "the rule is necessary to carry out
the purposes of the statute that granted such rulemaking authority" as determined by agency procedures which
are "based upon reasonably available empirical data and . . . include an assessment of the effectiveness and
the
cost of rules both to the state and to any private or public person or entity affected by such rules."92 Agencies
must file a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Secretary of State.93 The agency must also file a fiscal note
with the proposed rulemaking when that agency intends to adopt, amend, or repeal a rule that "would require an
expenditure of money by or a reduction in income for any person, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
proprietorship or business entity of any kind or character which is estimated to cost more than five hundred
dollars in the aggregate."94 Final agency rules cannot take effect until after 30 days following after the order of
rulemaking has been filed with the general assembly and the secretary of state.95 A rule is rendered void if
the
agency fails to follow these and other rulemaking procedures in adopting the rule.96
During the 2002 legislative session, the Missouri legislature amended Section 644.036; all future 303(d)
lists will be considered rules and therefore must abide by MAPA rulemaking guidelines.97 The statute,
as
amended states, "[a]ny listing required by Section 303(d) of the federal Clean Water Act . . . to be sent to the
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.010(4); NME Hospitals,Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services,
850 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
To be valid, rules must be promulgated according to the rulemaking procedures set out in Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.021
&
536.025. Id.
5
3
6
85 See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§
.010(4)(a)-(m).
86 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.010(4)(c).
8 878 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
88Baugus,
878 S.W.2d at 42.

Baugus, 878 S.W.2d at 42.
90 Id. (citing Arthur E. Bonfield, State Administrative Rule Making, § 3.3.1 (Aspen Publishers,
Inc. 1986)).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.014 (2000).
92 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.016.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.02 1.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.205(l) (as cited in Mo. Soybean., 2002 WL
45891 at *7).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.019.
See Mo Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 33 (citing NME Hospitals, 850 S.W.2d at 74).
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 644.036(5); Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 32,
n. I (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
89
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[EPA] for their approval that will result in any waters of this state being classified as impaired shall be adopted
by rule pursuant to chapter 536, RSMo." 98
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

The court first analyzed whether the state's 1998-303(d) list of impaired waters constitutes a rule under
MAPA statutory guidelines, because unless it does, the state court does not have the power to render a
declaratory judgment on the matter.99 The majority cited several key sections of the Act, as well as passages
from commentators distinguishing a rule from a simple statement of policy. 00 The court found that the list
created nouenerally applicable legal rights or obligations as applied to some "yet unnamed, unspecified group
of people." 01 Thus the court concluded it is only a compilation of waters that have substandard water quality
and not a rule because the 303(d) list did not establish a "standard of conduct" that has the "force of law." 0 2
The court then determined that the appellees' formulation of the list does not meet the expanded
standard of a rule as defined in the Baugus case.10 3 In Baugus, the court clarified MAPA's statutory definition
of a rule, stating that it must "have the potential, however slight, of impacting the substantive or procedural
rights of some member of the public."'1 In applying the Baugus standard, the court elaborated the long process
which must first occur before any regulation which might affect appellant is promulgated: EPA approval of the
list, scheduling of the TMDL, performing studies and implementing a plan of action, EPA approval of the
TMDL, and incorporation into the State's CPP, which ultimately leads to future regulations. 05 Because the list
is just the first step in this long process, the inclusion of the rivers on the list is not the cause of the impacts
appellants prophesize; rather, the resulting regulations are.106 The majority distinguished that the appellants
"prophesy the impact of a potential rule" rather than "identify the potential impact of a rule" as required to meet
the Baugus standard. 0 7 The court therefore concluded that the appellants' stated harms are only "pure
speculation"--they are conjectures of injuries that might result from future TMDL regulations.'os These
regulations may or may not be put into place as a result of the 303(d) list.109 Therefore, the court reasoned that
neither the Commission nor the MDNR engaged in rulemaking when formulating the 303(d) list."o
The court then enumerated the factors supporting dismissal of the appellants' action."' The first such
factor is that the state trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action.112 MAPA provides that
state courts have such power only regarding administrative actions constituting a rule." 3 Because the majority
determined that the 303(d) list is not a rule, they reasoned that state court did not have the power to provide the
judgment appellants wanted.
9'

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 644.036(5).

99 See Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d

at 22.

100See
io'

id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.

102 See id.

103 See id

'0 Baugus, 878 S.W.2d at 42 (citing Bonfield, supra n. 90, at § 3.3.1).
los Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d
at 24.
106 See id.
107 id

10 id.
Id.

109

110 See id.

See id.
112 See id. at 25.
.. Id. at 22.
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The next factor supporting dismissal is the court's conclusion that due to the hypothetical nature of the claims, a
declaratory judgment is not an appropriate remedy."l 4 A declaratory judgment is only available to adjudicate
"real, substantial, presently existing"' 5 controversies, and not hypothetical situations that may or may not
occur. Because appellants do not set forth a presently occurring injury which the declaratory judgment will
ease, it will not "lay to rest the parties' controversy."ll 6
The hypothetical nature of the allegations also led the court to establish that this issue is not yet ripe for
review, another factor supporting dismissal." 7 The ripeness doctrine is a constitutional guideline that prevents
the courts from making premature determinations on intangible controversies.118 The court first explained the
doctrine and then detailed both the seminal ripeness case, Abbot Laboratoriesv. Gardneril9 and Ohio Forestry
Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club,120 another case which explored the doctrine. Missouri follows a two-part test
based on Abbot in determining whether a controversy is ripe for adjudication: (1) whether adjudication is
appropriate for the issues at hand; and (2) whether the parties will suffer hardship if judicial relief is denied.121
The court found that MSA's claims do not meet either requirement.122
In its application of these standards to the facts of the case, the court looked to the result of MSA's
earlier action against the EPA in federal court, stating that "[n]either the law nor our rivers would be clarified by
an inconsistent holding." 23 The court reasoned that if the challenge to the federal government's approval of the
list is not ripe for adjudication, then the challenge to the State's earlier inclusion of the rivers also is not ripe.124
The State's impaired waters list demands no action from the appellants, and denies them no legal rights, and
there are no penalties for noncompliance.' 25 Stricter controls will only result after a long and complex process,
and the effects of these controls are unpredictable.1 26 The majority commented that "review now would require
a crystal ball or, at least, a lively imagination." 27 The court ultimately urged the appellants to "sheath their
swords until .. . regulations impacting them are proposed." 28
Chief Justice Stephen Limbaugh dissented, and Justice Benton joined his opinion.
The Chief Justice
found that the 1998-303(d) list meets the two statutory requirements of a rule delineated in Section 536.010(4)
of MAPA: (1) it must be a statement of general applicability; and (2) it must "implement" or "prescribe" law or
policy.130 Because the TMDL development is certain to occur in response to the list, and TMDLs have the
potential to affect millions of Missourians living near listed waterways, the list meets the "general applicability"
requirement.131 Because the list was developed as the first step in meeting the state and federal Clean Water
Id. at 26.
"' Id at 25 (citing Northgate Apartments, L.P. v. City ofN. Kansas City, 45 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001)).
116 Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 25 (citing Jones v. Carnahan.965 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1998)).
117 See Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d
at 26-29.
11 Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d.at 26.
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Id. General applicability is satisfied where the agency statement of policy or interpretation of law "acts on unnamed
and unspecified [persons and] facts." NME Hospitals, 850 S.W.2d at 74.
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Law's objective of protecting, maintaining and improving the state's waters, the- list was complied to
"prescribe" and "implement" environmental policy. 3 2 Therefore the dissent reasoned that the 303(d) list is a
rule.
The dissent then argued that the 303(d) list not only meets the statutory definition of a rule, but also the
Baugus expanded definition of a rule: an agency declaration with a potential, however slight, of impacting the
rights of some member of the public.' 33 The dissent found that this standard was easily satisfied because the

mere listing of the rivers triggers TMDL. development, which is certain to necessitate changes that will
invariably affect appellant association members.' 34 Because the 303(d) list is a rule promulgated in violation of
MAPA guidelines, it is void.135 Therefore, the dissent believed that the case should have been reversed and
remanded for reentry in favor of the appellants.136
V. COMMENT
When Congress passed the Clean Water Act on October 4, 1972 by overwhelming margins, they
recognized the serious health consequences of water pollution.137 The chairman of the Senate's Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution stated, "The cancer of water pollution was engendered by our abuse of our lakes,
streams, rivers and oceans; it has thrived on our half-hearted attempts to control it; and like any other disease, it
can kill us."13 8 Despite the passage of the CWA, the U.S. still struggles with pollutants in the nation's waters.
Data shows that as a direct result of the NPDES permit program, point source pollution, like discharge from a
pipe or similar conveyance, has decreased substantially over the last quarter century.139 But little or no progress
has been made in addressing non-point solution, generally caused by polluted run-off from fields and city

streets.140 Evidence shows that polluted runoff is the largest reason that approximately 40 percent of America's
surveyed waters are too polluted for basic uses like fishing and swimming.141 According to the EPA's 1994
Water Quality Inventory, agriculture is by far the leading source of non-point pollution for the nation's impaired
rivers and lakes.' 4 2
The question then becomes why non-point source pollution, as opposed to point source pollution,
remains such a problem.143 One explanation is that in general, point source pollution is much easier to regulate
than non-point source pollution. The CWA's NPDES program has been successful in imposing a set of
See Mo. Soybean Assn., 102 S.W.3d at 30. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
(citing Baugus, 878 S.W.2d 39).
dissent lists likely injuries as: changes in land management practices, limitation on sales and use of fertilizers,
pesticides, and herbicides, increased costs in satisfying new pollution standards, increased costs in water treatment, and
limitations on raw materials that can be used in production or manufacturing.
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U.S. EPA, What is Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Questions and Answers <http://www.epa.gov/owow/
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technology-based discharge limits on all point source dischargers and requiring that permit holders report on the
actual levels of pollutants being discharged.144 Apart from the basic fact that regulating runoff is generally
more difficult than regulating pollution from a pipe or sewer, another important factor is that the CWA does not
even attempt meaningful regulation of non-point source pollution.145 It simply requires that states manage
polluted runoff "to maximum extent practicable." 46 This means that "agricultural interests who dislike the
prospect of increased regulation of their discharges can subject those responsible for pollution controls to
pressure and make non-point source pollution controls lax." 47 In a state like Missouri, where large agricultural
interests have a lot of political clout, this factor may play a part in minimizing the regulations of non-point
source pollution, mainly agricultural runoff.
This factor plays a clear role in the drama that unfolded surrounding the instant decision. The Missouri
Soybean Association, along with other large agricultural associations, attacked the 303(d) list in the courts out
of fear of increased regulations on their land management practices. Essentially, they did not want TMDL
development that would force them to use fewer or different pesticides or herbicides. If they could attain a
judgment that the 1998-303(d) list was a rule, then it would be void for failure to follow the MAPA rulemaking
procedures. Also, the presence of the mandate for a hearing in the rulemaking context means that the agency
must meet interested members of the public face to face with an opportunity for oral presentation and
comment.148 For this reason, appellants want a determination that the list is rule to obtain more power to
influence future decisions during the extensive public notice and hearing process. Along with increased
influence due to the more public procedures, they also want to be able to attack the creation of the list in state
courts as early in the process as possible, and can only do so if the list is a rule. The earlier they can attack the
list, the longer they can stave off implementation of new TMDL regulations.
But the Association was unable to convince the federal court that the EPA's approval of the list
constituted rulemaking. The Association was also unsuccessful in their attempt to do the same in state courts.
The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately refused to recognize the Commission's addition of the rivers to the
MDNR's original list as rulemaking, and instead deferred to the federal decision, reasoning that an inconsistent
judgment in state court would clarify neither law nor the waters. The courts never reached the merits of the
case because of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the list is not a rule.
In interpreting the list as a mere recommendation rather than a rule, the courts essentially gave the state
agencies fewer procedural restrictions while still in the preliminary phases of determining which state
waterbodies are polluted and from what sources. The courts recognized that the recommendations were subject
to change as the state studied the waterways and developed appropriate TMDLs to address the pollution in each
waterbody. The courts also understood that this decision would not deprive any party from addressing its
concerns later in the process. The federal regulations include extensive public notice and hearing requirements
before any regulations are actually imposed. 49 These requirements will give agencies like the Association the
opportunity to challenge regulations that will impact their economic interests, once and if such regulations are
actually proposed. To allow these groups to challenge the agency at every step of the process stifles the
regulatory process and creates more litigation. Miring the state agencies in more administrative processes also
contributes to the complications that states already face in attempting to regulate non-point source pollution,

" See Caputo, supra n. 137, at 8.
See id. at 7.
146 See
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1 David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present
'4

and Future, 20 Hary. Envtl. L. Rev. 515, 515 (1996).
14' Alfred S. Neely, Mo. Prac., Administrative Prac. & Proc. vol. 20, § 6.39 (3d ed., West 2003).
14 See 40 C.F.R. § 130.
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making even harder the already difficult challenge of diminishing the severe environmental and health problems
associated with the pollution.
But the Association and other agricultural interests interpreted these decisions as an attempt to take
control away from the states and put it into the hands of the federal government. They argue that such a shift in
power denigrates the initial compromise of federal and state power as brokered in the CWA. From its
inception, the CWA has demanded a cooperative relationship between states and the federal government in the
effort to ensure the purity of the nation's waters. But the proper balance of power in this relationship has
proved difficult to find, especially regarding non-point source pollution. The Association and other agricultural
interests typically resent federal involvement in regulation of their agricultural practices and therefore fight to
retain as much state control as possible, where they have more influence.
The irony at the conclusion of this battle is that the judicial decision that the 1998 list is not a rule will
have no influence in Missouri's ongoing debate due to the statutory amendment that the legislature passed in
2002, in response to the Western District Appellate Court's decision. All future 303(d) lists are now considered
rules and must abide by rulemaking procedure. In enacting this legislation, the representatives presumably
responded to demands from constituents who were unhappy with a court decision that they perceived as taking
power out of the hands of Missourians and putting it into the hands of the federal government. In actuality, this
legislation will have the exact opposite effect. The CWA delineates clear deadlines for state agencies to submit
their 303(d) lists to the EPA for approval. If the agency does not meet the deadline, the EPA will create the list
without state input. Therefore, because this legislation effectively ties the hands of the state agencies by miring
them in the rulemaking process before they submit the list, it will be almost impossible for a state to meet the
deadlines if their lists come under judicial or administrative attack. This time consuming litigation is almost
certain to follow, especially when large waterbodies like the Missouri and Mississippi are included in the 303(d)
list. Thus more often than not, the EPA will end up creating the list anyhow, which leaves the issue of which
state waterbodies are impaired entirely up to federal discretion.
This phenomenon is already happening with the 303(d) list for 2004. The submission deadline is April
1, 2004, and the MDNR has already stated on three occasions that it will be impossible for it to meet that
deadline.150 On August 18, 2003 the Sierra Club issued a press release in which it asked the EPA to take over
the 2004 list.' 5 In the press release, Sierra Club's Clean Water Campaign Director Ken Midkiff pointed out
that federal law mandates that states meet the deadlines and with the new rulemaking procedures, Missouri will
not be able to do so. 152 He stated, "The Missouri General Assembly can pass all the laws it wants to tie
the hands of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources and the Missouri Clean Water Commission, but this
does not mean that federal laws can be ignored."' 5 3 Therefore, despite the Association's apparent legislative
victory in the ultimate decision that the 303(d) list is a rule, the ruling they were fighting for in the instant
decision and lost, is really not to their advantage at all.
VI. CONCLUSION

The CWA was forged with the important goal of joining the federal government and the states together
to protect the nation's waters from pollution. Big Agricultural interests argue that unless the 303(d) list is rule,
the balance of power is inappropriately shifted in favor of the federal government. They argue that local
interests need more influence over decisions and rules which impact local businesses.
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Although a balance of state and federal power was one of the CWA's goals, the main goal is still to
protect all waterbodies from the pollution that threatens them. Currently, Missouri's waters are still
endangered, largely from non-point source pollution caused by agricultural runoff. Missouri has been unable to
regulate this pollution for many reasons, one being that the large agricultural interests often exert political
pressure to fight environmental regulations they consider bad for business.15 4 The legislature responded to such
influence in amending Section 644.036 to ensure that future 303(d) lists are rules. The Association struggled to
attain this ruling because if agencies must abide by the administrative procedures required in the rulemaking
process, then groups like the Association would have more opportunities to influence the process and could
attack the decisions in the most preliminary stages in order to stave off TMDL development as long as possible.
The fact that the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, two of the largest rivers in the nation, were both listed
as impaired waterbodies should set off alarm bells for all Missouri citizens. Polluted waters are the true danger
that threatens the people of Missouri. If these major rivers are polluted now, then by the time the TMDLs
actually take effect, which will probably take several years, they will likely be even more polluted. Therefore,
the fight should not center on political interests or issues of federalism; rather, it should center on ensuring the
purity of our waters, especially of these large and vital rivers.
CLARE MURPHY
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